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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
W. P. ROGERS and 
MAGNA MINING COMPANY, 
a New Mexico Corporation, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs.-
UNITED WESTERN MINERALS 
COMPANY, 
a Delaware Corporation, 
Defendant a·nd Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8787 
P·etition F'or Rehearing 
By Plaintiffs and Respondents 
To THE HoNORABLE, THE CHIEF JusTICE AND THE AssociATE 
JusTICES oF THE SuPREME CouRT OF THE STATE oF UTAH: 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents, W. P. Rogers and 
Magna Mining Company, a New Mexico corporation, pre-
sent this Petition for a rehearing of the above cause and 
in su~port thereof respectfully show: 
1. The appeal taken in this cause by the Defendants 
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2. On June 30, 1958, this Court rendered its decision 
remanding the cause to the trial court for further pro-
ceedings to determine, by evidence dehors the written 
contract upon which the action was commenced, the inten-
tion of the parties signatory thereto, and reversing the 
judgment entered by the trial court in favor of your 
petitioners. 
3. The Plaintiffs and Respondents seek a rehearing 
for the following reasons: 
A. The trial court, ruling that the contract was 
unambiguous, held in favor of the Plaintiffs and Re-
spondents. This Honorable Court reversed that ruling 
and decision, declaring the contract to be ambiguous. 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents, advocating affirm-
ance of the trial court's finding did not, on appeal, 
argue matters in the written contract itself which are 
dispositive of the conflict which the Supreme Court has 
found in those provisions to be irreconcilable. 
B. The Plaintiffs and Respondents, in seeking to 
secure affirmation of the trial court's decision, ''ere 
justified in omitting arguments ""'hich favor a holding 
of ambiguity in the terms of said contract, and there-
fore like,vise justified in not submitting arguments 
dispositive of the ambiguity. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioners respectfully submit that 
a rehearing should be had and the decision of this Honor-
able Court revised to affirm the holding of the trial court 
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upon another ground or grounds, more fully treated in the 
Brief in support hereof, the Petitioners respectfully be-
lieving that a re-examination of the record will result in 
a revision of the decision herein and the avoidance of 
multiple litigation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiffs and Respondents wish to advance two 
reasons why a re-examination of the contract and the 
total record should cause the prior decision to be revised 
to affirm the trial court's result. 
We acknowledge our own omission to argue these 
points either forcefully or at all- but seek avoidance of 
the rule that a neglectful failure of that sort might pre-
clude a rehearing by asserting in justification of that 
default that all arguments before and the judgment of 
the trial court was that the contract was not ambiguous. 
We do not seek by this rehearing to contradict or argue 
with this Honorable Court's finding that the principal 
provisions of the contract argued and examined before it 
were conflicting. However, for those two reasons which 
are the argumentative points of this brief, we shall 
attempt to demonstrate that the ambiguity which the 
Court has found is dispelled and the irreconcilability 
resolved in favor of the same result as that reached by 
the trial court. 
It appears to us that more simplicity and clarity may 
be achieved by referring to the Plaintiffs and Respond-
ents, the petitioners herein, as the Sellers, and the Defend-
ant and Appellant as the Buyer. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE AGREEMENT RE-
SOLVES THE AMBIGUITY AND PREVENTS 
A FORFEITURE TO SELLERS AND UNJUST 
ENRICHJ\1ENT OF BUYER. 
PoiNT II. 
THE INTERPRETATION PLACED BY THE 
BUYER ON THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS 
OF THE AGREEMENT RESOLVES ALL 
DOUBT IN FAVOR OF THE SELLERS. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
PARAGRAPH 10 OF THE AGREE~IENT RE-
SOLVES THE AMBIGUITY AND PREVENTS 
A FORFEITURE TO SELLERS AND UNJUST 
ENRICHMENT OF BUYER. 
The Buyer, if unavailability of commercial ore is 
established by further proceedings in the lower court 
and is at the same time held to constitute a. defense to suit 
for the purchase price, has unjustly benefited and the 
Sellers have lost all title to their mining claims 'Yithout 
remedy. That such 'Yas not intended, not,Yithstanding 
even diametrically conflicting language in paragraph 3, 
is manifested ''Tithout any obscurity, doubt, or qualifica-
tion in paragraph 10 of the agreement 'Yhich reads : 
In the C\"ent the buyPr fails to make the payments 
for the halanre of the purchase price on the Cole-
man Canyon group of claims out of production 
from snid claims or fails to operate and mine said 
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group and does not pay the $500.00 per month on 
the purchase price as hereinabove provided, then 
and in any of such events, the sellers at their 
option may retake title to all of the Coleman Can-
yon group of claims, in which event the buyer shall 
have no further or other obligation relative 
thereto, or at sellers' option, may pursue any other 
legal remedy which they have against the Buyer. 
This section of the contract makes no reference to com-
mercially available ore. It states only that if the Buyer 
''fails to operate and mine said gro~tp a;nd does not pa.y 
the $500.00 per month on the purcha-se price" the Sellers 
may retake title or sue for the purchase price. The record 
is uncontradicted in that both of those conditions are 
unfulfilled: Buyer has not operated and mined the Cole-
man group, and has not paid the $500.00 per month. If 
the Buyer should argue that the phrase "as hereinabove 
provided" in any way conditions the obligation to mine 
and produce and pay Sellers 15% of the proceeds thereof 
or respond in monthly installments the complete ans·wer is 
that the reverse is true, viz. : those irreconcilable provi-
sions in paragraph 3 are controlled by this clearly 
en uncia ted option of remedies reserved to the Sellers. 
Then occurs the most significant stipulation, pro-
viding that : 
~ * • the payment out of production on the Cole-
man Canyon group of claims shall be a lien run-
ning with the title to said claims until the full P'Ur·-
chasp, prier is JJaid. (emphasis supplied) 
which is entirely vitiated by any contention that commer-
cially available ore is a condition precedent to recovery of 
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either (the Sellers having the option to elect) the claims or 
the purchase price since at the time of the conveyance to 
Buyer either monthly or production payments were all 
that remained. 
Paragraph 10, we submit, must control those con-
flicting expressions in paragraph 3, to resolve their 
ambiguity in favor of the result of the trial court for the 
fundamental rule that conflicting provisions in an agree-
ment are to be resolved by reference to unambiguous 
recitals bearing thereupon. 12 Am. Jur., page 783, Con-
tracts, Section 246, paragraph 2. 
Without giving expression to paragraph 10 which is 
the Sellers' remedy, the contract would operate to exact 
a forfeiture against Sellers and confer an unjust benefit 
upon Buyer. 
PoiNT II. 
THE INTERPRETATION PLACED BY THE 
BUYER ON THE AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS 
OF THE AGREEl\1ENT RESOLVES ALL 
DOUBT IN FAVOR OF THE SELLERS. 
Although reference 'Yas made in the original brief of 
these petitioners to the practical construction placed on 
the agreement by the Buyer, its significance assumes much 
greater proportion no"· that this Court has held certain 
portions of the contract to contain irreconcilable terms . 
. As pointed out in our original appeal brief, a letter 
agreement modified the original contract by granting, at 
the request of Buyer, an extension of time for the rom-
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mencement of thse disputed installments. We argued that 
this request was an acknowledgement of the contempla-
tion by the Buyer that it was obligated to pay and so inter-
preted the contract. We argued, however, that the origi-
nal agreement was unambiguous without reference to the 
amendatory supplement. The Court's holding now de-
mands, we submit, a closer analysis of exactly what was 
the nature of the obligation the Buyer wished to defer 
temporarily. 
Here we must state that it is immaterial what lan-
guage or what description the Buyer employed in its 
letter to the Sellers to identify the obligation it sought 
to defer. It is essential, we submit, to determine exactly 
what the Buyer had agreed to do which it desired de-
layed. The letter amendment drawn and submitted by 
the Buyer states, in the next-to-last paragraph : 
The date for beginning of payments out of gross 
mineral production, provided for in clause 3 of the 
Agreement of August 4, 1955, will be postponed 
until April 4, 1956. 
The clause 3 referred to states: 
* * * but there shall be no actual payment due to 
sellers by buyer for six months after the date of 
this agreement; however, the obligation shall 
accrue during said period as to any minerals pro-
duced and marketed even though payment is de-
layed until six months from the date of this agree-
ment. Thereafter, payment shall be made 
monthly* * * 
This six-month moratorium on all obligations of the 
Buyer was the one it sought to extend for an additional 
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two months. If the contract is given the meaning contended 
for it by the Buyer in this appeal, their request for this ex-
tension ca,n have no sense, meaning, or purpose whatso-
ever, and this is a very fine but equally momentous point: 
First, consider that for purposes of this argument, at least, 
the only unknown factor is the presence or absence of com-
mercial ore. If there is ore commercially available on the 
claims, then the Buyer, like any purchaser of a business 
property, would like the property to pay for itself. The 
Buyer here, kno,ving that it had obligated itself to pay 
a balance of $125,000, wanted to delay the payments 
thereon until the business property could begin liquidat-
ing its own encumbrance and requested that they be given 
an additional two months, enabling them to prepare for 
mining more sufficiently as well as benefit by later 
weather, for commencing these payments, either out of 
production or on a minimum basis. If ore could be mined, 
then the Buyer only had to pay to Sellers 15% of the 
gross value of production, even if that amounted to sub-
stantially less than $500.00 per month. Thus commence-
ment of actual mining - meaning actual production of 
minerals- would satisfy the obligation of the Buyer (R., 
page 4, para. 3 of the Contract and R., page 104 and page 
9 of Appellant's original brief). 
On the other hand, if the contract is interpreted the 
"~ay the Buyer nou~ contends, assume either one of the two 
possibilities, i. e., presence of ore or absence of ore, and 
no useful consequence can be attached to the amendment 
proposed by the Buyer. First, if there is commercial ore 
present they are going to be, even under their theory, 
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obliged to pay the full purchase price, so the time or 
manner of payment would be immaterial. If ore were 
not available in commercial quanties, and if as they have 
urged it is a condition precedent to recovery, then they 
could have waited five years or even more to make a de-
termination of that, arnd still have absolutely no liability. 
If their view were adopted and it ever is determined con-
clusively that ores cannot be developed commercially at 
the properties in question, the finding would relate back 
to April 4, 1956, and not only would the Buyer be excused 
from liability for the purchase price, but also the Sellers 
could not recover their property. That is the defense Buyer 
has asserted. Thus, under either circumstance, that is 
either with the presence of ore, or with the absence of ore, 
the Buyer could have had absolutely no purpose or objec-
tive in requesting and obtaining an extension of the mora-
torium on monthly payments of the balance unless the 
Buyer had been confident that it had an unqualified obli-
gation to pay something each month under either condi-
tion, either $500.00 per month or 15% of an actual mining 
operation. 
This is the contemporaneous and practical construc-
tion placed upon the agreement by the Buyer which should 
resolve any ambiguity found in the principal terms of 
the contract. Hardinge Company v. Eimco Corp., 1 Utah 
2d 320, 266 p. 2d 494. 
Stated succinctly, the Buyer viewed the contract pre-
cisely as we are now urging it to be construed by this 
Court: If the obligation to mine or pay monthly install-
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ments was unqualified, they could benefit by deferring 
those payments an additional two months. This benefit 
they sought and obtained (R. 29). If they had believed 
the contract to mean what they now contend it does, the 
extension could be of no benefit because if commercial ore 
were a condition upon recovery of the purchase price, 
they would have had no obligation at any time; that fact 
would have had relation back to execution of the contract 
and excused further performance. 
That the first time the Buyer has contended that 
commercial ore is a condition precedent to its obligation 
was in this lawsuit is clearly illustrated by their action in 
requesting and obtaining an extension of the first due 
date for a monthly installment. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully petition this Court for a rehearing 
and re-examination upon the record and the contract, be-
lieving that the Court might have some questions, 
answers to which counsel may assist the Court in reaching. 
Respectfully submitted~ 
OLSEN and CHAMBERLAIN 
Richfield, Utah 
10 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Resporulents 
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